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In public-private partnership transactions in the water 
sector, one of the alleged concerns is that there is little 
market competition at the auction stage. This paper casts 
light on a tradeoff between the competition effect at the 
auction level and potential economies of scale in service 
operation. If the authorities design a large-scale public-
private partnership water transaction, it is expected to 
exploit operational scale economies. But the competition 
effect may have to be sacrificed. The paper shows a risk 
that the selection of the contract size could be a very 
restrictive condition that excludes many prospective 
This paper—a product of the Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to examine how to improve efficiency of public-private partnership contracts in the water supply sector. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at aiimi@worldbank.org.  
bidders. Moreover, the paper quantifies the optimal 
size of public-private partnership contracts in the sector 
by estimating a cost function. The analysis shows that 
economies of scale exist but tend to diminish quickly as 
production increases. When the amount of water sold 
exceeds about 40 million m3, the statistical significance of 
economies of scale disappears. And there is no rationale 
for auctioning the water operation with annual water 
delivery of more than 400 million m3 under a single 
contract.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Following a large buoyancy in public-private partnership (PPP) transactions in the 
telecommunications and electricity industries, some water supply and sewerage services are 
also provided under the PPP framework. However, there has been a mixed picture of the 
water-sector PPP performance. Some experiences are praised, and others are not. The failure 
is partly attributable to design flaws in their auction mechanisms. One of the alleged 
concerns is that there is little market competition at the auction stage. It is not unusual that a 
PPP transaction in the water sector has no competition even under competitive bidding 
circumstances.  
 
In designing an auction for PPP infrastructure transactions, one of the most important policy 
decisions for the auctioneer is whether to bundle or unbundle potentially relevant transactions 
for optimizing the size of contracts. The current paper examines the possibilities of 
improving efficiency in water-sector PPP auctions and discusses whether or not the current 
choice of contract size is appropriate. There are two factors that potentially determine the 
optimal contract size: competition in the auctions and economies of scale in operation. The 
two factors may or may not be compatible with one another. Dividing a project into small 
contracts may look like an attractive approach for the auctioneer, because it will encourage 
more prospective firms to participate in the auction process. At the same time, however, the 
possible benefits from economies of scale and scope, which infrastructure construction, 
operation and maintenance usually exhibit, may have to be sacrificed.  
 
In general, the degree of competition at the PPP-related auctions tends to be low. Particularly 
in water-sector transactions, competition has been minimal (e.g., Foster, 2005). As per the 
Private Participation in Infrastructure Project Database (hereinafter referred to as PPI 
Database), the average number of firms that participate in a PPP auction ranges from three to 
six, depending on sector. In the water and sewerage sector, the average is about 3.6, which is 
unfavorable compared with other infrastructure sectors. Of particular note, in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC) region, the average number of participants in each water-  - 3 -
sector PPP auction is merely 2.2. Many water concessions in LAC were auctioned with one 
or two firms involved.  
 
From the competition point of view, auction theory suggests that the decision on whether to 
bundle or unbundle a set of relevant objects is essential for auctioneers to enhance 
competition and thus achieve high efficiency. Under multiple-unit auction circumstances, 
Palfrey (1983) shows that if there are only a few bidders for an arbitrary number of objects, 
the auctioneer should bundle all the objects to facilitate competition among them. By 
contrast, with a relatively large number of bidders the auctioneer may prefer to unbundle the 
objects. As per Chakraborty (2006), the entry cost is considered a key policy parameter to 
decide whether to bundle. It is shown that if the entry cost is sufficiently large, separate 
auctions become more preferable for the auctioneer as the cost increases. Moreover, if the 
auctioneer can choose the level of entry cost at the optimal level, separate auctions are 
always be superior to the bundle auction, regardless of the entry cost.  
 
The above (auction) competition argument may ignore the importance of possible affiliation 
among the values of the auctioned objects. From the practical point of view, a crucial 
determinant of the optimal contract size of PPP transactions is the extent to which the 
industry could exploit economies of scale at the operational stage. A water utility is still 
typically characterized as a network overlaid upon a spatial distribution of supply and 
demand, which could generate economies of scale (Clark and Stevie, 1981).
1 Garcia and 
Thomas (2001), estimating the cost structure of municipal water utilities in France, find 
significant economies of scale on average but considerable diseconomies of scale when the 
volume of delivered water is greater than 165 m
3 per customer. Positive economies of scale 
can be interpreted to mean that local water services may benefit from merging into water 
districts. Kim and Lee (1998) also find significant economies of scale in water service 
                                                 
1 There is a tradeoff between the cost of establishing facilities and the cost of transporting products/services in 
the network industry. Higher facility costs and lower transport costs would result in the centralized system. But 
lower facility costs and higher transport costs are associated with the decentralized one. Clark and Stevie (1981) 
find the optimal utility size.    - 4 -
provision for the Seoul metropolitan area. Nauges and van den Berg (2007) confirm the 
existence of total economies of scale for any size of utility operation in the cases of Brazil, 
Colombia, Moldova and Vietnam.
2  
 
By estimating the cost structure, this paper aims to infer the significance of scale economies 
in PPP operations of water systems in developing countries. Based on global experience, at 
the same time, it also provides evidence that the decision as to the contract size would tend to 
have strong power to restrict competition in the water sector.  
 
The tradeoff between the competition effect and scale economies seems to have been a 
traditional challenge for auctioneers in designing PPP-related auctions. In the 1993 Buenos 
Aires water concession case, for instance, the number of prospective bidders was expected to 
be small when all of Buenos Aires with 8.7 million of population (at that time) was 
contracted out in a single 30-year contract, which was among the largest ever bidding 
competitions in developing countries. However, a significant technical disadvantage of 
splitting the system to two regions was considered more problematic. There was also a 
political concern about the unprofitable suburban area when taking the unbundling strategy. 
As a result, a single concession was selected. Five consortia were prequalified, and only three 
of them actually bid on the transaction—and renegotiation occurred in 1997 (Alcázar et al., 
2002).  
 
By contrast, in the case of Mexico City’s water service management, the government decided 
to contact out various operations to four zonal contractors. At time of the auction in 1993, the 
city population amounted to 8.4 million. Seven consortia participated in the bidding process, 
and four operators were awarded for four zones comprising 16 delegaciones (Haggarty et al, 
2002).  
 
                                                 
2 In their argument, total economies of scale are referred to as returns to production density to distinguish from 
returns to scale, which take into account population increases and network expansion.    - 5 -
Notably, even in a small PPP water transaction, competition may also be limited. In the 
Conakry water lease contract concluded in 1989, six international water companies expressed 
interest, and only two consortia, which were composed of four initial applicants, submitted 
their bids. At that time, the city’s population amounted to about one million. However, the 
water system coverage was exceptionally low at less than 40 percent (Ménard and Clarke, 
2002). Hence, along with the competition and scale issues, other factors must affect the 
optimality of the contract size. In the Conakry case, both diseconomies of scale and 
diseconomies of customer density seem to have mattered.  
 
In the existing literature, there are few studies addressing a question about how to decide the 
optimal size of the PPP contracts. Under what circumstances should the auctioneers 
downscale or upscale the contract size in order to attract more potential bidders? The paper 
aims at providing certain qualitative answers to those questions.  
 
The following section is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the degree 
of competition in the water-sector PPP transactions, using the two comprehensive databases 
on PPP transactions in the world. Section III estimates a cost structure of water and sewage 
service operations where the private sector is partially or fully involved. Finally, Section IV 




II. OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION IN PPP TRANSACTIONS FOR WATER SERVICES  
 
Regardless the way in which the private sector is involved—i.e., traditional construction 
procurement or more comprehensive PPP contracts—the degree of competition generally 
tends to be low in the infrastructure industry. There are a very small number of active players 
in each infrastructure sub-sector, presumably because of the significant complexity and value 
involved in the infrastructure provision.  
   - 6 -
In the 3G mobile telecommunications experiences in European countries, for instance, the 
number of bidding firms per license ranges from 0.75 to 2.6. In the United Kingdom, five 
licenses were auctioned among 13 bidders. On the other hand, there was no competition in 
the Austrian and Swiss cases, meaning that the number of bidders was eventually the same as 
the number of licenses to be issued (Klemperer, 2002; van Damme, 2002). NOA (2007) 
indicates that half of the past U.K. PFI projects attracted at most two or three bids. Similarly, 
in the railway concession cases in Argentina and Brazil during the 1990s, two to four firms 
participated in the bidding process. Particularly, the freight train contracts, which may be less 
profitable from the private sector point of view, attracted only one or two bidders.  
 
How many bidders are required for sufficient competition? Gupta (2002) shows that the 
highway construction market (in Florida) becomes competitive with about six to eight 
bidders.
3 As per Iimi (2006), large-scale official development projects—mostly in the 
infrastructure sector—require eight firms to minimize the contract prices. In the U.S. 
offshore oil lease market, a similar level of bidder participation seems necessary for 
competition purposes (Brannman et al., 1987).  
 
Developing countries may have an even more limited competition in PPP infrastructure 
auctions. The PPI Database shows that about 60 percent of PPP infrastructure transactions in 
developing countries involved one to three bidders (Figure 1).
4 About 15 percent of contracts 
attracted only one bidder even under the competitive bidding circumstances. The degree of 
competition varies depending on sector. It is the lowest at 3.6 in the water sector. By contrast, 




                                                 
3 It means that the marginal impact of one more bidder on the equilibrium bid is not statistically significant 
when the number of participants exceeds eight. 
4 The database covers only transactions of which total investment commitments exceed US$ 1 million.    - 7 -
 











































































Source: PPI Database.  
 
A natural question is why auction-based competition is so limited in the water sector. Foster 
(2005) mentions that many water concession auctions in the Latin American in the 1990s 
involved one to three bidders. More importantly, it is indicated that market concentration 
seems high; three large international water service operators—i.e., SUEZ (former Lyonnaise 
des Eaux), Aguas de Barcelona, and Veolia Environnement (former Vivendi 
Environnement)—regularly participated in the PPP auctions. Hence, it seems that only a few 
firms are able to undertake PPP water transactions or compete with those incumbents.  
 
The Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region is in fact faced with a particularly 
serious problem with lack of competition in the water service transactions (Figure 2). The 
LAC countries, on average, involved only two firms in their competitive selection process. 
Moreover, the density distribution of the number of bidders per auction is heavily distributed   - 8 -
on the left side; the majority of PPP water transactions have no competition. This 
phenomenon is characteristic of the LAC region.  
 
Figure 2. Number of Bidders in Water-Sector PPP Auctions by Region  


































































Source: PPI Database.  
 
“Overspecification” is one of the alleged reasons for the limited competition in water-sector 
PPP transactions. In general, infrastructure construction and its operation and maintenance 
require a considerable amount of technical, experiential and managerial resources. On top of 
that, there are a few active players in the private water sector, as mentioned above. As a 
result, there is always a great risk that too restrictive qualification conditions could easily 
exclude most of potential firms that might be interested in bidding on the transactions.  
 
The Private Participation in Infrastructure Services (PPIS) Database, which covers most 
private and public water utilities over the world, reveals that the past PPP transactions in the 
water and sewerage sector seem to have been relatively small (Figure 3). For example, about 
90 percent of water contracts aim to deal with utilities producing—more precisely selling—  - 9 -
less than 100 million cubic meters of water per annum. Note that the figure excludes several 
outliers (i.e., extremely large observations) for illustration purposes. The figure clearly shows
that if the authorities attempt to contract out the water service operation selling more than 
100 million cubic meters of water, firms that had such operational experiences would be ve
limited even over the world. Similarly, there are few transactions to collect sewage water of 




ccordingly, there is a clear tradeoff between the competition effect at the auction level and 
 effect 
e 
he practical optimality of the contract size must depend on the extent to which the PPP 
nother interesting finding from Figure 3 is that the distribution of the number of employees 
oyees. 
                                                
A
potential economies of scale in service operation. If the authorities give priority to the 
operational scale effect and design a large-scale PPP water transaction, the competition
would be likely limited because of the small number of firms that are allowed to participate 
in the competitive bidding. This is exactly what happened in the case of the 1993 Buenos 
Aires water concession auction. On the other hand, if the authorities choose to unbundle th
transaction to several small contracts, a greater number of bidders can be expected to 
participate in the bidding process, possibly resulting in higher economic efficiency.  
 
T





5 This may be able to be interpreted to mean that the water-sector PPP has 
a potential structural problem of over-employment, whence low labor productivity. 
Particularly, small-scale service operations seem to necessitate relatively more empl
This may merely reflect the existence of economies of scale of operation with respect to 
labor input, but it could be an indication of excess employment.  
 
 
5 The data are not pooled but cross-sectional, taking the average when a utility has more than one observation 
after its private sector involvement.    - 10 -
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I. ESTIMATING ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN PPP WATER OPERATIONS  
mpirical model  





Based on the tradit
and Greene, 1976), the following cost function is estimated by a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) technique:  
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here C denotes total operating costs,   is ith output, and   is kth input price. 
or r 








wo technical characteristics are involved: the number of water connections denoted by ZW, 
w i Y k W m Z  
represents an exogenous technical variable, such as the netw k size, to control fo
heterogeneity among utilities.  
 
F
variables are adopted: the amount of water sold and the amount of sewage water collected
These are denoted by Yw and Ys, respectively. Our database covers both water and sewerage
utilities. Naturally, some water utilities are providing sewerage services as well. If an 
operator supplies either water or sewerage service, the nonoperational output measure 
at a very small positive number, but not zero.  
 
T
materials. Unit labor price WL is obtained by dividing total wage expenses by total number of
employees (in both water and sewerage operations). On the other hand, O&M material 
expenses potentially consist of various costs, and the unit price of input materials (WM) i
computed by dividing the operating expenses other than wages by the sum of the two outp
variables. This is just for computational purposes.  
 
T
and the number of sewage connections, i.e., ZS. These are supposed to capture the degree of 
economies of customer density. In the utility sector, it may be possible to increase service 
production with its network size unchanged, yielding higher profits. Even with some   - 12 -
adjustments of capacity required, the total cost may not increase proportionally. This effect is 
often referred as to economies of customer density.  
 
Given Equation (1), the following symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed to 
have a well-behaved cost function:  
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In addition, from Shephard’s lemma, the following factor share equations are obtained:  
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where Sk is the cost share of input k. Through the SUR model, the cost parameters are 
estimated in Equation (1) and one of the factor share equations (3).
6 The advantage of the 
SUR is that higher efficiency in estimation could be expected without wasting the degree of 
freedom (Christensen and Greene, 1976).  
 
Following the earlier literature (e.g., Baumol et al., 1982; Panzar and Willig, 1981; 
Rezvanian and Mehdian, 2002; Garcia and Thomas, 2001), the overall economies of scale in 










                                                 
6 One of the factor equations should be dropped to avoid the singularity problem.    - 13 -
where 
i Y η  is the cost elasticity with respect to output i. The degree of economies of customer 











m Z η  is the cost elasticity with respect to the number of connections Zm.  
 
Data  
All the data are employed from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Services (PPIS) 
Database, which provides the detailed operational information on most private and public 
water utilities since 1993. The current paper uses only observations under some types of PPP 
(affermage, management contract, lease, concession and divestiture). The cross-sectional 
time-series data are pooled; in most cases in our sample, each utility has 3–5 annual 
observations. Note that in the PPIS Database, the information on employment and wage 
expenses is not always provided separately for each of the water and sewage operations. In 
practice, the decomposition is sometimes infeasible when staffs are working on both 
operations.  
 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of costs, outputs, and factor prices. The sample 
observations are quite heterogeneous in any aspects, as indicated in Figure 3. For instance, 
annual operating expenses range from US$37,000 to more than US$ 100 million. The 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics  
Symbol Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
C Total annual operating expenses (US$) 16,127,980 24,862,140 37,032 167,203,400
Y W Amount of water sold (m3) 26,936,520 42,715,310 0 270,129,200
Y S Amount of sewage water collected (m3) 16,657,900 33,123,590 0 248,162,000
W L Unit labor cost (US$ per full time employee) 8,537 6,634 221 47,033
W M Unit operational material cost (US$ per sum of Y w and Y s) 0.310 0.207 0.011 1.482
Z W Number of water connections  79,344 103,904 0 585,953
Z S Number of sewerage connections 41,868 57,683 0 268,953
Type  (Affermage) Dummy for affermage 0.023 0.150 0 1
Type  (Concession) Dummy for concession transaction 0.716 0.452 0 1
Type  (Divestiture) Dummy for divestiture  0.013 0.114 0 1
Type  (Lease) Dummy for lease contracts 0.033 0.178 0 1
Type  (Management) Dummy for management contracts 0.216 0.412 0 1  
 
 
Estimation results  
Equation (1) is first estimated simply by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique, and it 
is also estimated jointly with Equation (3) by the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
model. The estimated cost parameters are shown in Table 2. The signs of the coefficients are 
broadly consistent with theory. When the dummy variables for the PPP nature are included, 
the operating cost under management contracts and concessions are found significantly 
higher than the baseline (i.e., divestiture). This is merely the correlation but not causality; the 
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Table 2. Estimated Cost Function of Water-Sector PPP Operation  



































































































*** 0.0042 0.0031 0.0023 0.0032
Type (Affermage) 0.1803 0.1347 0.1014 0.1219
Type (Concession) 0.1533 0.0890
* 0.1823 0.0815
**
Type (Lease) 0.0564 0.1103 0.0557 0.1005








No. of Obs.  306 306 306 306
R-squared 0.9891 0.9893 0.9863 0.9865
F-statistics 1110.78 947.62
Chi square 31777.2 32735.3
OLS SUR
Note that *, * and *** denote the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The 
divestiture case is used as a baseline.   
 
The implied cost elasticity with respect to production is calculated in Table 3. They are all 
evaluated at the sample means. The cost elasticity of water production is much higher than 
that of sewerage treatment. A 1-percent increase in water production would raise the 
operating cost by 0.7 percent. On the other hand, a 1-percent increase in sewerage operation 
would result in only a 0.1 percent increase in costs. These elasticities seem to generate 
considerable economies of scale in this industry.  
 
Indeed, the estimated overall scale effect, which is defined in Equation (4), implies that the 
water-sector PPP operation would be likely to exhibit economies of scale on average. When   - 16 -
evaluating the scale effect at the sample means, the hypothesis that SE is less than unity can 
be easily rejected (Table 4). Note that the standard errors are calculated by the delta method.  
 
The PPP water operation also seems to benefit from economies of custom density (ECD) 
defined in Equation (5). The estimated ECD is significantly greater than unity, meaning that 
a 1-percent increase in both water and sewerage connections would raise the total cost by less 
than 1 percent, while holding other conditions constant; thus, an increase in network size is 
profitable for operators.  
 
Table 3. Estimated Cost Elasticity  












Economies of scale 1.149 0.026
***




Importantly, the empirical degree of economies of scale and customer density may differ 
depending on reference points. As shown in Figure 4, economies of scale tend to diminish 
quickly as production increases. When the amount of water sold exceeds about 40 million 
cubic meters (m
3), the expected scale effect becomes insignificant in a statistical sense. It is 
noteworthy that the PPP water operators may continue to benefit from economies of scale 
even beyond this threshold. But the impact is statistically ambiguous. When the level of 
water supply exceeds 400 million m
3, the operation will suffer from diseconomies of scale; 
SE becomes significantly lower than one. Note that the figure depicts the impact of water 
production (Yw) on the degree of scale economies while keeping other variables constant at 
their means.  
 
The result is consistent with the pioneer industrial literature in this industry. Clark and Stevie 
(1981) find that the most efficient water utility size is about 221 million m
3 (or 58,300 
million gallons) of water supply per year. In terms of service area, the optimal size is   - 17 -
approximately a 9½-km (or 6-mile) radius circle in their study; the estimated marginal cost 
can be minimized when the service distance from the central operation point becomes 
9½ km.  
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The speed at which economies of customer density diminish is relatively slow compared with 
the case of economies of scale. Figure 5 shows the estimated economies of customer density 
(ECD) depending on the number of water connections (Zw). Even if the water distribution 
network is quite sizable, ECD tends to be significantly greater than one.  
 
As shown in Figure 3, the majority of PPP water transactions involve the network with less 
than 400,000 connections. The maximum size in our sample is about 600,000 (Table 1). 
Around those levels, significant economies of customer density can always be expected. 
Provided that the network size exceeds four million connections, the customer density effect 
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IV. DISCUSSION   
The estimated degree of economies of scale has a direct implication for designing water-
sector PPP transactions. Solely from the point of view of economies scale, there is no 
rationale for auctioning the water operation with annual water delivery of more than 
400 million m
3, presumably in the case of metropolitan and large urban areas. When the size 
exceeds this level, auctioneers should consider the possibility to unbundle the transaction to 
several zonal contracts. Although there is no such case in our sample, the whole PPIS 
Database includes 103 utilities with annual water sales of 400 million m
3 or above.  
 
Recall that large contracts cannot fully exploit the competition effect because they usually 
require prospective firms to have had similar experiences in the past. There are a few 
operators that are involved in large-scale PPP transactions in the water sector. The 
unbundling strategy is conducive to enhancing competition and improving auction efficiency.  
 
Conversely, auctioneers may have to adopt the bundling strategy, if each contract involves 
water supply of less than 40 million m
3. Such small transactions would suffer from 
unrealized economies of scale. One policy guideline is to put into a single contract several 
small-scale operations in small cities or rural areas. However, it is worth noting that this   - 19 -
bundling criterion is more ambiguous to interpret than the unbundling strategy in the sense 
that the outputs in the estimated cost function are implicitly assumed to be produced within a 
single system. Thus, the estimation result is applicable for the case where multiple water 
systems adjoin and could be connected with each other. But it may not suitable to the 
situation where several separate water systems are intended to be bundled. Although 
bundling can still bring about certain economies of scale by pooling financial and managerial 
resources and skilled labor force, geographical proximity may be necessary.  
 
Kim and Lee (1998), estimating the cost structure of (public) local water supply services in 
Seoul, suggest that the total production cost could be reduced by about 10 percent if 42 local 
areas in the city were merged into four submarkets. The grand integration into a single 
operator could decrease the cost by 47 percent. Too small-scale operation is not desirable.  
 
Interestingly, the 1993 Mexico City’s experience appears broadly consistent with our 
estimation result. At time of introducing the management contract, the water production 
amounted to 1,113 million m
3, and the uncounted for water was estimated at 51 percent 
(Haggarty et al., 2002; Shirley and Ménard, 2002). Hence, the amount of water sold exceeds 
our threshold, i.e., 400 million m
3. Since the city was divided into four zones, the average 
water sold was approximately 140 million m
3, which is above the lower threshold to exploit 
economies of scale to the maximum extent.  
 
In the Buenos Aires water concession case, the amount of annual water production reached 
1,402 million m
3 with an uncounted-for-water rate of 45 percent in 1993. The authorities 
could have to divide the operational area to at least three zones in order to encourage 
competition further. The transactions with 700 million m
3 of annual water sales are 
absolutely exceptional (as shown in Figure 3). However, there are a certain number of water 
companies who have operated with the production scale on the order of 100–300 million m
3.  
 
The Conakry water lease contract may have been too small to take advantage of economies 
of scale at the time of the transaction, because its annual water production amounted to 16   - 20 -
million m
3 but the rate of unaccounted for water was about 60 percent (Ménard and Clarke, 
2002). The rate improved to less than 50 percent by the mid-1990s. The level of water 
distribution loss is apparently an important parameter to be considered for having a right size 
of contract.  
 
Notably, bundling or unbundling is merely one of the measures to increase competition; there 
are many other possible design flaws that could produce inefficient auction outcomes. For 
instance, if a transaction is separated into multiple contracts, the demand reduction 
equilibrium might take place, which has an anti-competitive effect (Ausbel and 
Cramton, 2002).
7 Renegotiation after the award, which stems from the bidders’ strategic low-
balling strategy on the auction stage, is also frequently criticized in the PPP market (e.g., 
Guasch, 2004). Prequalification may be an important policy device to prohibit bidders who 
have insufficient and doubtful capability from submitting unrealistically low-priced bids 
(Cripps and Ireland, 1994; Branco, 1997; Ware et al., 2007).
8 Whether to allow (large) 
bidders forming a bidding coalition remains open to argument (e.g., Cho et al., 2002; 
Iimi, 2004).
9 Explicit collusion and corruption are out of the question.  
 
Finally, the above result does not necessarily contradict the existence of small-scale water 
supply and sanitation service providers, such as community water vendors. Particularly in 
remote areas, many people in developing countries have no access to utility services and 
depend on small private or communal service providers (e.g., WSP, 2007). However, small-
                                                 
7 Ausbel and Cramton (2002) demonstrate that in auctions where bidders desire to purchase multiple items at a 
market-clearing price, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings.  
8 Theoretically, a two-stage selection based on both quality and price bids may be supported (Branco, 1997). As 
per Ware et al. (2007), however, the qualification process may tend to be corruption- and collusion-prone in 
practice.  
9 In theory, there is an incentive for bidders to divide themselves into two bidding consortia under the free 
interaction circumstances (Cho et al., 2002). Empirically, some joint bidding has been found pro-competitive.    - 21 -
scale services are usually much more expensive than utility tariffs, most likely because of a 




V. CONCLUSION  
 
In water-sector PPP transactions, one of the alleged concerns is that there is little market 
competition at the auction stage. The worldwide database indicates that the degree of 
competition is lowest in the water sector among infrastructure industries. In the majority of 
water transactions, there has been no competition. The average number of firms that 
participate in the competitive bidding process is merely 2.2 in Latin America.  
 
The paper examined a tradeoff between the competition effect at the auction level and 
potential economies of scale in service operation. If the authorities design a large-scale PPP 
water transaction, it is expected to exploit operational scale economies. But the competition 
effect may have to be sacrificed.  
 
The paper found that the density distribution of the operational size of the past PPP 
transactions is very skew in the water and sewerage sector; hence, a small number of firms 
are allowed to participate in the auction, if the contract involves sizable operation. The 
selection of the contract size could be a very restrictive condition that excludes many 
prospective bidders.  
 
Using a large PPP transaction database, the cost function of the water-sector operation is 
estimated. The estimated overall scale effect is found significant and positive. But economies 
of scale tend to diminish quickly as production increases. When the amount of water sold 
exceeds about 40 million m
3, the statistical significance of economies of scale would 
                                                 
10 WSP (2007) shows that private small-scale water and sanitation services in Peru are 15 times as expensive as 
utility services. At the same time, however, 6.7 million or 24 percent of total population of Peru do not have 
access to water supply services and are dependent on some small-scale service provision.    - 22 -
disappear. Moreover, if the level of water supply exceeds 400 million m
3, the operation will 
suffer from diseconomies of scale.  
 
A tentative quantitative policy implication is that there is no rationale for auctioning the 
water operation with annual water delivery of more than 400 million m
3. To enhance the 
competition effect, auctioneers should consider the possibility to unbundle the transaction to 
several contracts.  
 
On the other hand, auctioneers may desire to put several small-scale operations into a single 
contract, if each operation involves water supply of less than 40 million m
3. Such small 
transactions could not take full advantage of economies of scale in operation. Notably, these 
thresholds are a tentative conclusion only from the point of view of economies scale, 
ignoring many other relevant factors.  
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